Countering the Consideration o f Extra-Legal
Factors in Damage Award Decisions
There has been extensive controversy concerning the intricacies o f juror decision making. One area o f focus in that controversy has been civil damage awards. Many argue that this is an area in which jurors are allowed too much latitude and must make important decisions based upon ambiguous instructions. In addition to producing great variation among award amounts, such ambiguity leaves these award decisions open to the effects o f extra-legal influences. There is an abundance o f evidence demonstrating that jurors consider extra-legal factors when making damage award decisions (Wasserman & Robinson, 1980; Hans & Ermann, 1989; MacCoun, 1996) .
As defined by In are plaintiffs that are more likely to win (irresistible plaintiffs) or defendants that are more likely to have large damage awards levied against them (deep pocket defendants).
The deep pocket theory proposes that jurors award larger amounts against defendants that appear to have more money. Therefore, simply because a defendant has a greater ability to pay, he will be required to pay larger amounts. Until this point, the idea that such factors impacted verdicts and damage awards had been liberally claimed, but not empirically tested.
Based on the Cook County data, Chin and Peterson (1985) did find evidence for the deep pocket effect. Amounts awarded against corporations were higher than those awarded against individuals. The authors, however, did point out that the cases involving corporate defendants also differed from the cases involving individual defendants on other dimensions. Corporate defendants were more likely to be involved in high stakes cases and cases with multiple defendants. Using statistical analyses to control for those factors, a corporate/individual difference was still found. Damage awards were higher against corporations when the plaintiff suffered injuries that were not severe, but in cases o f severe injuries the difference became much larger.
A regression model based on the verdict data collected in Cook County, Illinois, was developed by Hammitt, Carol, and Relies (1985) . This model predicts strong differences in award amounts between suits filed against corporations and suits filed against individuals. After taking injury and case type into account, the authors predict that awards against corporations will be 34 percent larger than awards against individuals. This difference is even more pronounced in cases in which the plaintiff suffers severe and permanent injuries. In these instances, awards against corporations are predicted to be 4.5 times higher than awards against individuals.
As is previously summarized, past research in this area has focused on the Vidmar (1994) warns experimenters o f just such errors. Although data o f this type provides certain useful information, Vidmar (1994) suggests that experimenters resist being drawn to archival data merely because it pertains to "real" cases. The author warns o f the numerous dangers involved in relying solely on research o f archival data.
Not only is it impossible to eliminate alternate hypotheses, but often cases from different jurisdictions differ on so many dimensions that the cases are no longer even comparable.
These problems underscore the need for laboratory research demonstrating the same corporate/individual difference found in archival data. Wasserman and Robinson (1980) An interest in examining differences in public attitudes concerning corporate and individual wrongdoing led Hans and Ermann (1989) to conduct a study that lends support to the corporate versus individual bias. The authors constructed two scenarios describing workers who developed illnesses after being contracted to perform a job. As a result the workers brought legal action against the party that hired them. The scenarios were identical except for the identity of the defendant. Half o f the participants received scenarios in which the defendant was Mr. Jones, the other half, the Jones Corporation.
Participants were asked to determine liability, damages, and criminal negligence.
Findings in all three categories supported a bias against corporations (Hans & Ermann, 1989) . The Jones Corporation was significantly more likely to be found liable for plaintiff injuries. Once liability had been established, larger damage awards were awarded against the corporate defendant than the individual defendant. This difference was particularly large for pain and suffering damages, which is the category in which jurors have the most freedom in their award decision. In addition, Mr. Jones was much less likely then the Jones Corporation to be voted as criminally negligent.
Further attitudinal questions revealed that participants regarded lawsuits against the corporation as both more fair and more reasonable than the lawsuits against the individual. Criminal charges were also viewed as more fair when they were brought against the Jones Corporation than when they were filed against Mr. Jones. Participants rated the degree o f harm suffered by the workers as the same across groups, but perceived the actions o f the corporate defendant as much more sinister than the actions o f the individual defendant. The corporate defendant was found to be "more reckless, more morally wrong, and more deserving of punishment" than the individual defendant (Hans & Ermann, 1989, p. 158) . Corporations were also rated as more likely to have previously been aware o f the dangers, less regretful after the incident, and less likely to change their behavior in the future.
These findings indicate that award discrepancy between corporate and individual defendants is due to something more intricate than the defendant's ability to pay.
Although the corporation was seen as having a greater ability to pay awarded damages, this was far from the only difference found between the two defendants (Hans & Ermann, 1989) . The fact that the corporation was generally viewed in a more negative light than the individual, despite the fact that all case characteristics were identical, suggests that the public has a much harsher opinion of corporate wrongdoing than o f individual wrongdoing. These findings led the authors to speculate that much more than a deep pockets phenomenon was occurring. The authors propose that jurors hold corporations to a higher standard than individuals and as a result have a more negative view o f corporate wrongdoing. This less lenient attitude toward corporations then leads to higher damage awards against corporate defendants.
MacCoun (1996) , the owner of a "construction contracting business with many concurrent projects and a large crew of construction workers" (wealthy individual defendant), or a corporation that is a "construction contracting business with many concurrent projects and a large crew o f construction workers" (corporate defendant) (MacCoun, 1996) .
Controlling for defendant wealth, MacCoun (1996) found that mock jurors still gave larger damage awards when the defendant was a corporation, rather than an individual. This bias against corporations occurred even when the individual was described as a wealthy individual with the same assets as the corporation. These findings are not consistent with the deep pocket hypothesis, which has previously been used to explain the corporate versus individual award differential. If the award decisions were guided by the defendant's ability to pay then the judgments against the corporate defendant and the wealthy individual should be both comparable and significantly higher than the judgments against the blue-collar individual. Instead, as was the trend in past research, similar judgments were awarded to the individual defendants with higher judgments awarded against the corporation.
An empirical examination by Vidmar (1995) did not produce results consistent with the archival analyses or the previous research in this area. His experiment was designed to test the notion that medical malpractice cases are somehow treated differently than other types of cases and that this difference is attributable to the perceived "deep pockets" o f insurance companies. Vidmar (1995) assigned participants to read either a malpractice or automobile negligence case that had either one defendant, two defendants, or a corporate defendant. He found no differences in mean award amounts between groups.
It is uncertain why Vidmar's (1995) findings were not consistent with past research. Due to the medical malpractice focus of Vidmar's (1995) study, the case descriptions were somewhat different than the scenarios used in the previously cited studies. These differences may have somehow influenced award amounts. In the corporate conditions, the cases depended on the legal doctrine o f vicarious liability in which employers are responsible for the actions of their employees. Additionally, the cases were such that in the individual conditions, the defendants actually committed a negligent act. The injuries were not due to improper corporate policies, but rather due solely to the actions o f the individual. Therefore, it was not actually the corporation that committed the injurious act, although the corporation was legally responsible for it.
Under these circumstances, it is not terribly difficult to imagine that the previously documented difference may be alleviated by a desire to award larger damages against a defendant that directly committed the act and less against a corporation that was indirectly responsible for it. However, the award differences found by MacCoun (1996) were consistent across six different cases, some o f which involved the issue o f vicarious liability.
There could be numerous reasons why damage award decisions against corporations are higher than those against individuals. As suggested by Hans and Ermann (1989) , the difference could be attributable to corporations being held to a higher standard. The attribution theory can account for such a difference in standard. A corporation is composed of a number of people. A group o f people, due to their collective resources, may be expected to have greater foresight about such matters than an individual (Hans & Ermann, 1989) . Additionally, it may be easier for jurors to award large damages against corporations because it is a more impersonal entity than an individual (MacCoun, 1996) . Along the same lines, Hammitt et al. (1985) suggests that jurors may be balancing the good that the money will do the plaintiff against the harm that paying the awarded amount will do to the defendant. It may be easier for jurors to perceive the award as harmful when it is against an individual than when it is against a corporation.
Regardless of the reason behind this effect, the defendant's status as a corporation or individual is a factor that has been shown to be a consideration for the purposes o f Further evidence in this regard is provided by Wissler, Evans, Hart, Morry, and Saks (1997) . Wissler et al. (1997) examined how fault attributions affected pain and suffering awards. The authors manipulated the degree of defendant fault and found marginally significant differences (p=.067) for pain and suffering awards between groups across the five case scenarios. In addition, for one of the five cases, there were strong differences between award amounts for very responsible versus less responsible defendants (p< 001). This indicates that weaker findings may be due to weaker manipulations or factors specific to the given case summary.
The Hans and Ermann (1989) experiment also lends support to the notion that defendant reprehensibility influences compensatory award decisions. The authors assert that these differences may be due to corporations being held to a higher standard than individuals. Based on this standard, identical actions may be considered more reckless when committed by a corporation than by an individual. Consistent with that idea, the conditions in which mock jurors awarded high damages were also the conditions in which the respondents considered the defendant to be most reckless. The traditional method o f dealing with factors that jurors are not supposed to consider has been to not mention or to ignore those factors. In certain instances, this is a legitimate method of bias reduction. Courts routinely withhold information from, or blindfold, juries as a means o f reducing bias. Not informing jurors o f a defendant's past criminal record is an example of blindfolding for that purpose. In this example, a bias would be very likely if the jurors were given that information and blindfolding is a logical answer. The problem, however, arises when the idea o f not addressing a bias is applied in situations in which ignoring the bias does not eliminate it. There are some circumstances in which it would be more beneficial to stop ignoring that jurors may consider particular factors and instead instruct them otherwise. Not telling a jury whether a defendant in a motor vehicle accident suit carried insurance is an example of problematic blindfolding. This information is not given to jurors because it is a factor that is not supposed to be considered. However, if the matter at hand is something about which jurors already have established beliefs or expectations, then blindfolding is unlikely to serve its intended purpose (Diamond & Casper, 1992) . In this case, it is understandable that jurors may assume that the defendant has insurance though he or she may not. It is also understandable that this assumption may influence jurors damage award decisions. This illustrates the importance of recognizing and dealing with any biases that will not be corrected for by simply not addressing those issues with the jurors.
The consideration of extra-legal factors in award decisions has not been eliminated by ignoring it. Jurors must be informed that such considerations are inappropriate. In addition, explaining to jurors the purpose o f each type of damages and the reasons that certain factors should not be considered should lead to better compliance with the instructions than mere admonitions not to consider those factors (Diamond & Casper, 1992) .
Furthermore, in order for jurors to follow judicial instructions, the instructions must be clearly written. Clarity o f judicial instructions has been studied across many legal specters. Juror's lack of understanding of judicial instructions has been evidenced in various legal circumstances. Jurors have been shown to be unclear as to the degree of certainty that is required by the reasonable doubt standard even after receiving specific judicial instructions (Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, 1996) . Additionally, Reifman, Gusick, and Ellsworth (1992) found that jurors understood less than half o f the instructions they were given. It is therefore evident why such variation in juror decision-making exists. It The literature has also speculated as to the effects o f including specific examples injudicial instructions. In particular, the death qualification literature raises the concern that if jurors are given a list of mitigators, they may interpret the listed mitigators as the only mitigators they are allowed to consider. This concern also arises when constructing judicial instructions as to what may and may not be considered when awarding civil damages. This study incorporates this concern into the design by creating two conditions that list examples. In one example condition, one of the factors that is being examined (corporate/individual status) will be included as an example in the list, but the other factor (defendant reprehensibility) will not The other example condition will be the opposite. Defendant reprehensibility will be included as an example in the list, but corporate/individual status will not. All other examples in the list will remain the same.
Additionally, the two variations of the example condition are needed to ensure that the instructions are not having an undesired effect. It is possible that listing factors, such as defendant's corporate status, may make that factor more salient and thus increase the chances that it will influence decision-making. This would result in an even greater disparity in awards between the two types of defendants. By creating two example conditions, one in which the defendant's status is given and one in which it is not, this possibility can be examined and ruled out. 
Procedure
The experimenter was allowed to recruit participants from the excess venirepersons that remained in the jury pool at the end of each day. Participants were advised that a study was being conducted for educational purposes and that the goal of the study was to examine jury decision-making, particularly in civil cases. They were informed that their participation was completely voluntary and were told that they would be asked to read a civil case summary, award damages based upon that summary, and complete a short questionnaire. Participants were randomly assigned to groups (with 11-13 persons in each group) and given a complete questionnaire. After completing the questionnaire, participants were allowed to ask the experimenter questions and when any questions had been answered, participants were thanked and excused.
Results
Compensatory damage award data was analyzed using a 2 X 2 X 4 (Corporation X Reprehensibility X Instruction Type) analysis of variance (ANOVA). As was previously stated, the compensatory damage awards were broken down into four categories. For the purpose of analysis, those categories were summed to form a total compensatory award which was used as the dependent measure. 
Discussion
As expected, both the defendant's status as a corporation or an individual and the degree o f defendant reprehensibility were shown to effect punitive damage awards.
Punitive awards were higher when the defendant was a corporation as opposed to an individual. Higher awards were also given against more reprehensible defendants as opposed to less reprehensible defendants. The highest mean punitive awards were awarded when the defendant was identified as a corporation whose conduct was highly reprehensible. This demonstrates that mock jurors are considering defendant characteristics when making punitive award decisions. This is consistent with the legally intended purpose of punitive awards, which is to punish defendants for negligent conduct.
It is both a reasonable and a desirable effect to see that defendants who act in a more reprehensible manner will be punished with higher damage awards.
However, the results also indicate that mock jurors also consider these defendant characteristics when awarding compensatory damages. This finding is not consistent with the legally intended purpose of compensatory awards, which is solely to make the plaintiff whole again. Participants awarded higher compensatory damages when the defendant was a corporation rather than an individual, and when the defendant's actions were highly reprehensible. In essence, the mock jurors seem to be using both types of damages to punish the defendants for the incident. This occurred even in conditions in which the mock jurors received instructions not to consider defendant characteristics and were given those specific It was hypothesized in this experiment that if jurors understood that the two types o f damages were developed to serve separate purposes and thus were made to be based on separate considerations, then they would be more likely to make more legally sound decisions. This hypothesis was based on the intuitive, yet empirically unfounded premise that education on the law would lead to a higher standard in upholding the law.
However, contrary to the previous optimism of the experimenter, judicial instructions have not been shown to have considerable impact injury decision-making.
Another explanation for the failure of judicial instructions to have an effect may be seen by examining the type of task the jurors are asked to perform. It is generally accepted that jurors take their duty very seriously and are quite motivated to make the right decision. However, by asking jurors to fully compartmentalize these two award types and maintain full control over what aspects of the case affect their decision-making, the courts may be asking jurors to complete a task that simply is not within human Upon further examination, it may be discovered that the courts are, in essence, asking jurors to do the impossible. If that is the case, less traditional methods o f bias reduction, must be sought out and tested. One such less traditional method would be to assign separate juries to make each type of award decision with each jury being given only the information that they are legally allowed to consider in making their decision. In addition, it may be found that the best way to eliminate or control for the bias may be to collapse the compensatory and punitive damage awards into a single type o f damage award in which all o f the pertinent factors may be considered.
Levels of Instruction
Pattern Instructions Judge s Instructions: I will now instruct you on the law you must follow in reaching your decision. The defendant has been found liable for the injuries sustained by Mr. Davis. It is now your responsibility to award Mr. Davis such sum as you find will fairly and justly compensate him for any damages he sustained as a direct result of the defendant's negligence.
In addition to any damages which you find Mr. Davis entitled, you may, but are not required to, award Mr. Davis an additional amount as punitive damages if you find it is appropriate to punish the defendant or to deter defendant and others from like conduct in the future. Whether to award plaintiff punitive damages, and the amount of those damages, are within your discretion.
Expanded Instructions
Judge's Instructions: I will now instruct you on the law you must follow in reaching your decision. The defendant has been found liable for the injuries sustained by Mr. Davis. It is now your responsibility to award Mr. Davis such sum as you find will fairly and justly compensate him for any damages he sustained as a direct result of the defendant's negligence. The sole purpose of these damages is to make Mr. Davis whole again or return him to his state prior to the accident. This type of damages is not to be used to punish the defendant. For this reason, you may consider only the extent o f Mr. Davis' needs and injuries and how these injuries will affect the remainder of his life. You may not take into consideration any characteristics of the defendant.
In addition to any damages which you find Mr. Davis entitled, you may, but are not required to, award Mr. Davis an additional amount as punitive damages if you find it is appropriate to punish the defendant or to deter defendant and others from like conduct in the future. Whether to award plaintiff punitive damages, and the amount of those damages, are within your discretion. This type of damages is meant to punish and deter and in making this award, you may take into account conduct and characteristics of the defendant. However, the purpose of these damages is not to further compensate the plaintiff so you should not consider the plaintiff s needs or injuries.
Expanded Instructions with Reprehensibility Example
Judge's Instructions: 1 will now instruct you on the law you must follow in reaching your decision. The defendant has been found liable for the injuries sustained by Mr. Davis. It is now your responsibility to award Mr. Davis such sum as you find will fairly and justly compensate him for any damages he sustained as a direct result o f the defendant's negligence. The sole purpose of these damages is to make Mr. Davis whole again or return him to his state prior to the accident. This type of damages is not to be used to punish the defendant. For this reason, you may consider only the extent of Mr. Davis needs and injuries and how these injuries will affect the remainder of his life. You may not take into consideration any characteristics of the defendant, such as the defendant s assets, ability to pay, or the offensiveness of the defendant's conduct.
In addition to any damages which you find Mr Davis entitled, you may, but are not required to, award Mr. Davis an additional amount as punitive damages if you find it is appropriate to punish the defendant or to deter defendant and others from like conduct in the future. Whether to award plaintiff punitive damages, and the amount of those damages, are within your discretion. This type of damages is meant to punish and deter and in making this award, you may take into account conduct and characteristics of the defendant. However, the purpose of these damages is not to further compensate the plaintiff so you should not consider the plaintiff s needs or injuries.
Expanded Instructions with Corporate/Individual Example Judge's Instructions: I will now instruct you on the law you must follow in reaching your decision. The defendant has been found liable for the injuries sustained by Mr. Davis. It is now your responsibility to award Mr. Davis such sum as you find will fairly and justly compensate him for any damages he sustained as a direct result o f the defendant's negligence. The sole purpose of these damages is to make Mr. Davis whole again or return him to his state prior to the accident This type of damages is not to be used to punish the defendant. For this reason, you may consider only the extent of Mr. Davis' needs and injuries and how these injuries will affect the remainder o f his life. You may not take into consideration any characteristics of the defendant, such as the defendant's assets, ability to pay, or whether the defendant is an individual or a corporation.
In addition to any damages which you find Mr. Davis entitled, you may, but are not required to, award Mr. Davis an additional amount as punitive damages if you find it is appropriate to punish the defendant or to deter defendant and others from like conduct in the future. Whether to award plaintiff punitive damages, and the amount of those damages, are within your discretion. This type of damages is meant to punish and deter and in making this award, you may take into account conduct and characteristics of the defendant. However, the purpose of these damages is not to further compensate the plaintiff so you should not consider the plaintiffs needs or injuries. 
